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Abstract
This analysis investigates a political corruption model that builds on
previous literature on corruption in hierarchies. Our study enriches the
literature on political corruption emphasizing the contrasting role of the
minorities having a control role of the majorities. In particular, this paper
provides a set-up for the conditions in which a briber can choose between
either bribing only the majority and accepting the monitoring of the mi-
nority, or alternatively, bribing also the minority, which gives up to its
control role and increases the probability of success of the illicit action.
Minorities can exploit their typical monitoring role in modern democracies
either to gain a reputational premium or to get involved in bribing and
raising higher stakes. Thus, policy-makers face a sort of paradox when
attempting to strengthen the control role of minorities and reduce cor-
rupt behavior because this may cause the opposite e¤ect of inducing the
minorities to get involved into the illicit activity and, eventually, spread
the corruption disease.
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1 Introduction
The following analysis builds on the several cases of political corruption, in
which private individuals, groups, or rms inuence through illicit conducts
the state institutionsdecision-making process. The distinctive trait of political
corruption is the interaction between private and public actors through which a
collective good is illegitimately converted into private-regarding payo¤s(Hei-
denheimer and Johnston, 2002). The main element characterizing the illicit
conduct is the payment of money or other utilities to corrupt public o¢ cials in
exchange of some private advantage against the public interest. This situation
occurs in a variety of forms and touches upon several state institutions such
as the legislative assemblies, the executive power, and the judiciary (Klitgaard,
1988). For instance, private interests can bend legislative assemblies to their
will by corrupting elected politicians. In particular, modern elective assemblies
consist of a majority, which has the decisional power in the choice and design of
laws, rules and regulations, and a minority, which exerts a control over the ma-
joritys actions and can become majority in future elections (Varian, 1990). In
general, the minority has the interest to expose any misconduct of the majority,
especially if this could jeopardize public interest through corrupt activities, and
gain reputation in front of the public opinion.
Our analysis is placed exactly on this context. This paper provides a theo-
retical analysis on the conditions in which a briber can choose between either
"buying" only the majority and accepting the control role of the minority, or
alternatively, buying also the minority, which gives up to its control role and in-
creases the probability of success of the illicit action. The theoretical idea draws
on the literature of corruption in hierarchies (Bac 1996a, Bac 1996b), in which
a subordinate can potentially deliver a "corrupt service" to a corrupter, and a
supervisor can prevent the subordinates corrupt behavior because of misaligned
goals. The subordinate can also corrupt the supervisor and generate a collusion
(Calvo, 1987; Tirole, 1986)). However, in the following setting we address sev-
eral questions to political corruption with actors operating according to typical
political drives. Does stronger control power to minorities reduce corruption?
Or, rather, does a stronger control role increases minoritys bargaining power
vis-à-vis the briber? Under which conditions does the briber prefer to corrupt
only the majority or, rather, buy the minority and thereby reducing the risk?
What are the most suitable policies to address the possible failure in the minor-
itys control role and possibly exploiting the wedge in the conicting political
goals between minority and majority?
From a policy-maker viewpoint to answer these questions is very important.
The policy-maker faces a sort of paradox when attempting to strengthen the role
of minorities and reduce corrupt behavior because this may give the opportunity
to the minorities to rip o¤ high stakes and cause the opposite e¤ect of inducing
the minorities to get involved into the illicit activity. The model suggests that
the "minority capture" especially regards a¤airs of signicant dimension (i.e.,
protection of monopoly power, allocation of industrial subsidies, destination of
conspicuous public expenditure), which are all typical issues of modern and
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developed economies (Amundesen, 1999). In the long-run, this situation could
cause an institutional decay of political institutions.
Interestingly, this model applies not only to political corruption but also
to the state or regulatory capture cases in which bribing is in the form of an
inuence that is exerted through licit but obscure forms of pressures, which are
never overt (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). Along these lines, the cost of
being exposed to the public opinion and elections can be considered similar to
the cost of being ned and/or jailed as a consequence of the corrupt activity,
and the role of minorities can be substituted by the watchdog prole of several
associations protecting a wide range or rights.
The article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model
and study the possible bribes and the corruption equilibria. Section 3 provides
a welfare analysis and the policies to reduce the negative impact of corruption.
Section 4 contains a discussion of results and extensions, especially about the
role of minority.
2 The model
A potential briber B can obtain a rent, r, by corrupting political parties. We
assume only two political parties, the majority X, which has decisional power,
and the minority Y , which has the power to monitor Xs activities and help de-
tecting possible corrupt activities involving X.1 The briber can obtain the rent
by choosing between two di¤erent scenarios: 1) bribing only X and incurring
in Y s monitoring that increases the probability to be detected and punished,
or 2) bribing both X and Y to avoid Y s monitoring.2
In the rst scenario, Y decides which level of monitoringm to exert. Regard-
less of Y s level of monitoring, there exists an exogenous positive probability 
that the corrupt activities can be detected and punished. The term  is given
and depends on the e¤ort exerted by independent institutions (e.g., police, ju-
diciary, antitrust agencies, consumersassociations, etc.), which are assumed to
be incorruptible. Therefore, the probability function  of detection and pun-
ishment is such that (m) : R+ [ f0g ! [;  < 1], which is increasing and
strictly concave. Y incurs a cost of monitoring c(m) : R+ [f0g ! R+, which is
increasing, strictly convex, and such that c(0) = 0. If corruption is detected, B
and X are punished and each incur in a ne f , while Y obtains a reputational
premium p because it has not been involved in bribing.3
In the second scenario, both X and Y accept the bribes. Therefore, there is
1Monitoring can occur through participation in parliamentary activities and committees
or any other relevant means by which minority exerts its control role. Minority has also a
watchdog role when informing the public about goings-on in the political or governmental
choices.
2Trivially, a necessary condition for B to obtain r is to bribe X.
3This reputational or credibility premium does not stem directly from Y s monitoring
activity. Y increases its reputation in front of public opinion and electorate simply because
it has clean hands relative to X. Monitoring increases the chances to unveil possible Xs
misconducts and eventually the Y s probability to obtain the reputational premium.
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no monitoring and the probability to be punished and detected is at its minimal
level, . If corruption is detected, B, X, and Y are all involved and each incurs
in a ne f .
Hence, we consider under which conditions B bribes only X and accepts Y s
monitoring, or B bribes both X and Y .
2.1 The expected utility
By assumption if no bribe occurs the utility of each agent is zero. All agents
are considered risk-neutral. For simplicity, we assume that the detection and
punishment occurs after the illicit transactions take place, that is afterB receives
r, and X or both X and Y receive their bribes. This implies that in case of
detection and punishment, the corrupt political parties must give up to their
bribes and B must refund the state institutions for the illicit rent acquired. This
must occur on the top of the sanction f . Finally, we assume that X can deliver
r at no cost. In the following, the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the rst scenario
(i.e., bribing involves only X) and the second scenario (i.e., bribing involves
both X and Y ), respectively.
The expected utility functions of the briber in each scenario are EUB1 and
EUB2, where:
EUB1  [1  (m)] (r   bx1) + (m) ( f   bx1) (1)
= [1  (m)] r   (m)f   bx1,
EUB2  [1  ] (r   bx2   by2) +  ( f   bx2   by2) (2)
= [1  ] r   f   (bx2 + by2) .
Wherein bx1 is the bribe given to X in the rst scenario, bx2 and by2 are the
bribes given to X and Y , respectively, in the second scenario, and m is the
optimal level of monitoring exerted by Y in the rst scenario.
The expected utility functions of the majority are EUX1and EUX2, where:
EUX1  [1  (m)] bx1   (m)f , (3)
EUX2  (1  ) bx2   f . (4)
Finally, the expected utility functions of the minority are EUY 1and EUY 2,
where:
EUY 1  [1  (m)] [ c(m)] + (m) [p  c(m)] (5)
= (m)p  c(m),
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EUY 2  (1  ) by2   f . (6)
Notice that since the exogenous probability of being detected and punished,
, is positive, a zero-level optimal monitoring,m = 0, implies EUY 1 > 0. Thus,
EUY 1 = (m
)p   c(m) > 0 8m  0. This is not surprising. If corruption
hits and X gets involved, Y has positive expected gains in terms of relative
reputation from the detection and punishment of X even if Y did not or could
not provide direct monitoring. If the corrupt activity is fully successful, we
assume that bx1 is not reinvested by X to acquire further political consensus.
Lemma 1 A necessary condition to be in the second scenario is that m > 0.
This simple Lemma requires that Y is involved in bribing only if its monitor-
ing activity has an impact on the probability of detection, and thus negatively
inuence Bs expected utility. Otherwise, if m = 0, B prefers bribing only X,
and Y has an expected utility equal to p.
2.2 The bribe
In the rst scenario X will nd it protable to be engaged in the illegal action
provided that EUX1  0. So that baskx1 must be such that:
baskx1 
(m)
1  (m)f . (7)
Likewise, the maximum bribe B is willing to o¤er must satisfy the individual
rationality constraint EUB1  0. Thus, bbidx1 must be such that:
bbidx1  [1  (m)] r   (m)f . (8)
The following condition must hold:
bbidx1  baskx1 . (9)
In the second scenario, the bribe asked by X must satisfy the condition that
EUX2  0. So that baskx2 must be such that:
baskx2 

1  f . (10)
The bribe asked by Y must satisfy the condition UY 2  EUY 1(m) > 0,
8m > 0. Thus, basky2 must be such that:
basky2 

1  f +
(m)p  c(m)
1   . (11)
In the case B bribes both X and Y then basky2 > b
ask
x2 . In other words, if
bribed, Y asks more than X because the former has an expected positive payo¤
from remaining clean vis-à-vis X and can trigger its entitlement to monitoring
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so to increase the probability  to obtain p by exposing Xs misconduct to
public opinion. In this perspective, X can only ask to be compensated by the
expected cost of being caught and punished.4
The maximum bribe B is willing to o¤er must satisfy the individual ratio-
nality constraint EUB2  0. Thus, bbidxy  bbidx2 + bbidy2 must be such that:
bbidxy  (1  ) r   f .
Therefore, the following condition must hold:
bbidxy  baskx2 + basky2 . (12)
For simplicity, we assume no bargaining, such that B can drive bribes to
their minimal amount. Consequently:
bx1 = b
ask
x1 =
(m)
1  (m)f ,
bx2 = b
ask
x2 =

1  f ,
by2 = b
ask
y2 =

1  f +
(m)p  c(m)
1   .
The bribe bx1 is proportional to the ne f , and because the risk of detection
and punishment increases, bx1 is increasing in m
. In the second scenario,
m inuences positively by2 and identies the potential threat that Y can move
against the positive ending of corruption through its impact on (m). B incurs
in a cost for removing this threat, which is proportional to the expected potential
prot of Y in case of monitoring. On the contrary, bx2 does not depend on m

but simply depends on the risk of incurring in a ne, and for any m > 0,
this is the lowest bribe that X can achieve. In the same way, Y must also be
covered against the risk of being detected and punished. As a consequence,
in the second scenario, Y obtains a higher bribe than X, due to the potential
threat of monitoring that it can exert. Therefore, the minority can exploit a
role that is originally assigned to increase the democracy rate within a specic
context, such as a legislative assembly, to it own interest by exploiting corrupt
practices.
2.3 Solutions
Consider the following functions, which derive from the compatibility conditions
of the bribes (9) and (12):
r  (m
) [2  (m)]
[1  (m)]2 f  r1(m
), (13)
4Notice that by assumption X delivers r at no cost.
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r  2f + (m
)p  c(m)
(1  )2 +
f
1    r2(m
). (14)
The frontier r1(m) includes all the allocations (m; r), with m  0, such
that B is indi¤erent between bribing or not bribing only X. Similarly to r1(m),
the frontier r2(m) includes all the allocations (m; r), with m > 0, such that
B is indi¤erent between bribing or not bribing both X and Y . Notice that
when m = 0, r2(m) is not dened because the second scenario does not arise.
Furthermore, notice that both r1(m) and r2(m) do not depend on .
The two functions r1(m) and r2(m) help to dene the allocations (m; r),
or likewise ((m); r), for which B has either no convenience to pay bribes or
nds it protable to corrupt only X or both X and Y . The following proposition
hold.
Proposition 2 For a given m, a) if r > min [r1(m); r2(m)], then bribing
occurs; b) if r < min [r1(m); r2(m)], then no bribing occurs; c) if r2(m) >
r > r1(m
) or r1(m) > r > r2(m), then B bribes only X or both X and Y ,
respectively; d) if r > r2(m) > r1(m) or r > r1(m) > r2(m) then B bribes
only X i¤ EUB1 > EUB2, otherwise B bribes both X and Y .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, it is important to understand under which circumstances r2(m) >
r1(m
) or vice-versa. Now let us dene the following upper and lower bounds for
the two functions r1(m) and r2(m) such that we can analyze their behavior
for any m.
r1 = lim
m!0
r1(m
) =
 (2  )
(1  )2 f;
r2 = lim
m!0
r2(m
) =
2f + p
(1  )2 +
f
1  
r1 = lim
m!+1r1(m
) =
 [2  )]
(1  )2 f
r2 = lim
m!+1r2(m
) =
2f + E
(1  )2 +
f
1   with E 2 (p; p)
Corollary 3 The following inequalities hold: a) r1 > r1; b) r2 > r2; c) r2 > r1;
d) r2 > r1 i¤ Ef >
(1 )2
(1 )2 [(2  )] 
 
3   2, whereas r2  r1 otherwise.
Proof. Trivial.
Following the Corollary (3), if r2 > r1 then r1(m) < r2(m) 8m > 0
Proposition 4 a) r1(m) is increasing and convex in m; b1) r2(m) is in-
creasing and concave in m iif @(m
)
@m p   @c(m
)
@m > 0; b2) r2(m
) is decreasing
and concave in m iif @(m
)
@m p  @c(m
)
@m < 0.
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Proof. See the Appendix
The previous Corollary (3) and Proposition (4) state that r2(m) is always
higher than r1(m) for low levels of m, that is for levels of (m) that are
close to . For higher levels of m, two di¤erent cases can occur: A) r2(m) >
r1(m
) 8m;5 B) there exists a couple (m0; r0) such that r2(m0) = r1(m0),
and r1(m) > r2(m) 8m > m0. In other words, for relatively high levels of
m, and thus for increasing levels of (m), bribing both X and Y is the only
available option for B. Notice that r1  r2 regardless of which Proposition
(4-b1) or (4-b2) hold. Trivially, if Proposition (4-b2) holds, r1  r2 is more
likely to occur.
Corollary 5 If r2 > r1, then case A (i.e., r2(m) > r1(m) 8m) occurs. A
necessary condition for r2 > r1 8mis p > 2f .
Proof. See the Appendix.
According to Corollary (5) as reputational premium decreases, the cost of
punishment for the corrupt agents increases, and (  ) increases, then case B
is more likely to occur.
The following gures depict these two di¤erent cases, according to the values
of r and (m).
5A necessary and su¢ cient condition for this to occur is r2 > r1.
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In both gures, the set of allocations ((m); r) such that r > min [r1(m); r2(m)]
allow B to bribe in at least one of the two scenarios. In Figure (1-A), from the no
corruption area (i.e., r < r1(m)), as r increases, corruption is possible only by
involving X (i.e., r2(m) > r > r1(m)). For further increases in r, then B has
the option to involve also Y on corrupt activities (i.e., r > r2(m) > r1(m)).
This situation does not depend on m. To put it simply, when the stake is
not high enough but it is su¢ cient to trigger some form of bribing, then the
minority is not involved and pursues its control role. Higher stakes may cause
a full capture of the bribers of the decisional and control role. In Figure (1-B),
the situation is very similar for levels of (m) relatively close to . This means
that if minoritys monitoring does not have a signicant impact on the proba-
bility of detection and punishment then the briber may be induced to corrupt
also the minority only if the stake is rather high. This holds regardless of the
two cases depicted in the gure. However, if monitoring is rather harmful (i.e.,
(m) rather distant from ) for the criminal misconduct, then corrupting the
minority becomes a priority: from a no corruption area, as r increases, corrupt-
ing both X and Y is the only available option (i.e., r1(m) > r > r2(m)).
This situation occurs because 1) the expected gains from monitoring can be-
come particularly high as (m) increases, and 2) Y s monitoring can contribute
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signicantly to detection and punishment (i.e.,     is high).
From Proposition (2) if r > r2(m) > r1(m) then B bribes only X i¤
EUB1 > EUB2. As shown in both Figure (2-A) and (2-B), even if r is su¢ ciently
to bribe also Y , the risk reduction from (m) to  by bribing Y provides a lower
expected benet than paying a bribe to Y and buying its "silence". Therefore,
we can identify an area where both scenarios may occur, but eventually B nds
it protable to bribe only X. In this area the condition EUB1 > EUB2 holds.
According to previous Propositions (2) and (4), the equilibria depend on
the features of the institutional environment. In particular, the overall level of
exogenous contrast against corruption (i.e., ), how much protable in terms
of reputational premium is monitoring for Y (i.e., p), the e¤ectiveness of Y s
control role (i.e., (m)), the ability in monitoring (i.e., c(m)), and trivially the
ne f , all inuence Bs choice of bribing or not, and which scenario to choose.
If r > r2(m) > r1(m) or r > r1(m) > r2(m) the following condition holds.
Proposition 6 A su¢ cient condition for  [EUB2   EUB1] > 0 is r > r2(m
)(1 )
(m)  .
Proof. See the appendix
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This su¢ cient condition identies all the allocations ((m); r) such that the
second scenario is preferred to the rst one. Following Figure (2-A) and (2-B),
these allocations lie in the area on the furthest right. This condition implies
that for a given r, an e¤ective monitoring, such that (m) is well above ,
induces to bribe also the minority.
3 Welfare analysis
In this section we focus on the impact of bribing on collective welfare. Social
welfare depends on whether corruption occurs or not, and which scenario takes
place. If corruption does not occur, welfare loss (EW0) is simply put to zero.
If corruption occurs, we assume that if corruption is not detected and punished
(1 (m)), welfare decreases byM(> 0), which is lower than r.6 Furthermore,
notice that the bribes and the nes are zero-sum terms. Finally, in the rst
scenario, social welfare must take into account Y s positive expected payo¤
(i.e., (m)p c(m)). Thus, the possible welfare-loss functions when corruption
occurs are:
EW1 = (1  (m)) [r  M ] + (m)p  c(m) rst scenario (15)
EW2 = (1  ) [r  M ] second scenario (16)
Assume that
Condition 7 (m)p  c(m) < (1  (m)) [M   r]
This condition implies that the positive payo¤s obtained by bribing and
monitoring (in the presence of bribing) are always lower than the negative ex-
ternality caused by bribing (i.e., M). Consequently, no corruption (i.e., EW0)
is socially preferable.
Proposition 8 8m  0, EW0 > EW1 > EW2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 9 jEW1   EW2j is increasing in m.
From a social viewpoint, the rst scenario is preferable to the second scenario
because of a lower welfare loss. However, the welfare loss EW1 decreases as the
optimal monitoring increases.
6For simplicity, we assume that the cost of detection and punishment by the exogenous
institutions is zero.
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3.1 Policies
Policies can have a direct and an indirect impact on social welfare. The direct
impact has an e¤ect on the welfare-loss functions. The indirect impact has an
e¤ect on agentsdecisions about which scenario takes place (i.e., either EW1
or EW2). We can identify four possible policies; Figure 4-A and 4-B help to
understand their e¤ects.
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First, the policy-maker can a¤ect the cost of monitoring by, for instance, en-
forcing more transparency through more e¢ cient control rules, simpler access to
documentation by the minority, etc. This policy reduce directly the welfare loss
in the rst scenario, that is jEW1j decreases, while the second scenario is not
directly a¤ected. At the same time, this policy indirectly modies the scenarios
occurring over the allocations ((m); r) in the Figures 1 and 2. In particular,
r2(m
) moves to the right, this implies that the area in which the second sce-
nario takes place is larger. Second, another policy can a¤ect the reputational
premium p, exactly in the same way of c(m), for instance, by emphasizing the
transparency role of the minority or its monitoring role. Third, an increase in
the level of the ne f , for instance by sti¤ening the penalties against corruption,
has only indirect e¤ects through the increase of the no corruption area. Fourth,
the policy-maker can increase  by improving its investigative and judiciary
system. In this case both direct and indirect e¤ects occur: in both scenarios the
welfare loss decreases, and the corruption area decreases.
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4 Conclusions
This analysis investigates a political corruption model that builds on previous
literature on corruption in hierarchies. Our investigation enriches the literature
on corruption emphasizing the contrasting role of the political minorities. On
the one hand, the minority can reduce corruption behavior due to their control
role and obtaining a reputational premium for its political credibility; on the
other hand, we found that this role gives a bargaining power vis-à-vis the briber,
and consequently spread corruption throughout political institutions. In par-
ticular, the more important the control of the minority the higher the bribing
stakes that it can receive from the briber. Notice that the existence of corrup-
tion itself provides a positive expected payo¤ to the minority. Therefore, if the
briber wants to involve the minority and reduce the risk, the briber must o¤er
a bribe that takes into account not only the detection and punishment risk but
also an additional compensation for the loss of gain from reputation.
The policy-maker faces a sort of paradox when attempting to strengthen
the role of minorities to reduce corrupt behavior because this may give the op-
portunity to the minorities to rip o¤ high bribes. This situation can especially
occur where the rents from corruption are substantial, such as in developed
economies. In addition, the reputational premium is also a¤ected by the insti-
tutional setting. For instance, in a democratic system, the freedom of speech
and the presence of several watchdogs can increase the reputational premium
of those in charge of a control role. Paradoxically, the feelings of moralization
against political corruption may generate a serious setback because the minority
can use the potential reputational premium to its own advantage.
Coherently with the economics intuitions, high rents from corruption can
facilitate to extend corruption to the minority. Therefore, the investigative
authorities should increase the spectrum of the controls to all politicians in the
presence of potential high stakes from corruption.
Finally, this model easily applies to the phenomenon of regulatory or state
capture where the briber is the lobby attempting to capture the regulator/legislator,
and the minority can expose the potential social welfare loss from the capture
to the public opinion. In this context, the minority can be intended outside
politics, such as a consumersassociations or independent watchdogs, and they
can also be eventually "bought" by the lobbyist.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 2
The compatibility conditions of the bribes (9) and (12) imply that the bribing
occurs; otherwise If r < min [r1(m); r2(m)], then no bribing occurs.
Thus, if r > r2(m) > r1(m) or r > r1(m) > r2(m) then for a given m,
B bribes only X if  [EUB2   EUB1] < 0: where
 [EUB2   EUB1] = [(m)  ] (r + f) + bx1   (bx2 + by2)
Proof of proposition 4
r1(m
) is increasing and convex in m because @r1(m
)
@m > 0 and
@2r1(m
)
@m2
> 0
where
@r1(m
)
@m
=
f
(1  (m))3

2  2(m) + (m)2 > 0;
@@r1(m
)
@@m
=
f
(1  (m))3

6  4(m) + (m)2
(1  (m))

> 0
r2(m
) is increasing and concave in m because @r1(m
)
@m > 0 iif
@(m)
@m p  
@c(m)
@m > 0 and
@2r1(m
)
@m2
< 0 and
r2(m
) is decreasing and concave in m because @r1(m
)
@m < 0 iif
@(m)
@m p  
@c(m)
@m < 0 where
@r2(m
)
@m
=
1
(1  )2

@(m)
@m
p  @c(m
)
@m

=
(
> 0, @(m)@m p  @c(m
)
@m > 0
< 0, @(m)@m p  @c(m
)
@m < 0
@2r2(m
)
@m2
=
1
(1  )2

@2(m)
@m2
p  @
2c(m)
@m2

< 0
Proof of Corollary 5
r2 > r1 , [2 )](1 )2 f >
2f+E
(1 )2 +
f
1 or ,by computing
E
f
>
(1  )2
(1  )2 [(2  )] 
 
3   2
It is trivial to demonstrate that
E
f
 p
f
>
(1  )2
(1  )2 ((2  )) 
 
3   2 > ((2  ))  3   2 > ((2  )) :
Thus a necessary condition for r2 > r1 8m is that
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p
f
> (2  )() p > 2

f
Proof of proposition 6
If r > r2(m) > r1(m) or r > r1(m) > r2(m) then for a given m, B
bribes only X if  [EUB2   EUB1] > 0: where
 [EUB2   EUB1] = [(m)  ] (r + f) + bx1   (bx2 + by2)
= [(m)  ] r   (1  ) r2(m) + g(m)f
where g(m) = (m)

2  (m)
1  (m)

increasing and convex.
Thus, su¢ cient condition for  [EUB2   EUB1] > 0 is that
r >
(1  )
(m)   r2(m
):
Proof of proposition 8
EW1 > EW2 ,
(m)p  c(m) > [((m)  ] [r  M ]
it always holds.
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